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Justice and Peace Office

Maryknoll Fathers & Brothers
Maryknoll, New York 10545
(914) 941-7590

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November 20, 1980

The Honorable Edmund Muskie
Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Muskie:

I write to you at this time to express the deep and growing concern for the life of Kim Dae Jung of South Korea, a concern shared by many both within and outside of South Korea.

For your information, I am enclosing a copy of a document that I recently received from South Korea, which indicates the analysis of several people working in the movement for democracy in that country. Apparently it is the impression of many within Korea that for all practical purposes the United States government, as well as Japan, has written off Kim Dae Jung.

I personally do not think this is the case, and I certainly hope it is not. However, there does seem to be a growing anti-Americanism within Korea, and a growing impatience with regard to the prospects of living under the present totalitarian regime.

What is at stake in the case of Kim Dae Jung is not only the life of an individual person who had courageously worked for the restoration of democracy to his country, but the future of South Korea itself. Indeed, we are dealing with the most serious and critical matter.

Also enclosed is a copy of a testimony presented by Fr. J. Bryan Hehir for the United States Catholic Conference before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs last September 8. Fr. Hehir had the opportunity of visiting Korea during the period of the original trial of Kim Dae Jung. His testimony includes a very serious critique of U.S. policy as it relates to Korea in general, taking up the interrelationship between human rights and security. It is the point of Fr. Hehir (and a point which I fully agree with) that human rights and security cannot be separated. The greatest assurance of security, in Korea as in the world, is a genuine and honest-to-goodness commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights in all its ramifications. I think the very serious problems in Korea today, as well as in other parts of the world, relate to an attempt to separate security interests from interests in human rights.

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Once again, Mr. Secretary, I urge you with all the power that is within me to do everything that is possible, on behalf of the Carter administration, to insure the life of Kim Dae Jung. What happens to Kim Dae Jung will most certainly have grave effects on the future security of the South Korean people as well as, ultimately, our own security.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas J. Narti

Rev. Thomas J. Narti, M.M.
Director

TM:ed

cc: Ms. Patricia Derian

Encs.

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Korea, October28, 1980

Last week Presidential Secretery, Haw Kun Do called leading newspapers leaders to the Blue House. In light of the 95.5% voting turnout for the Constitutional referrendum he felt that that the government had a sufficient mandate to move with their stated policies. These men were then ordered to begin an anti-Kim Dae Jung campaign. Demonstrations will likewise be started.

The analysis by people in the movement for democracy is that the U. S. and the Japanese governments will not react strongly to the execution of Kim Dae Jung. They feel that he will most likely be killed before Christmas. There is a feeling tht Japan and the U.S., at the very least have given their consent and at the very most planned with the Korean government the moves it has taken. Therefore there is a growing feeling of anti-American and anti-Japanese developing. If it looks as though Kim Dae Jung will be executed the democratic forces will make one last - even if suicidal - attempt to change things. At that time their fury will most likely be equally directed against Japanese and Americans in the country.

The Kwangju people were divided into four groups. A group (7 pe are the leaders; B Group (77 people) are teachers and students; C group (58 people) are those who were in the Provincial Headquarters when it was taken; and D Group (13) the ~~Control~~ Committee. The total is 155 people.

A Group:(7 people)
Bae Yong Ju, 34 yrs., driver, death
Pak No Jong, 28 yrs., printer, death
Ha Yong Kyol, 30 yrs, factory worker, life.
Youn Jae Keun, 28 yrs. factory worker, life
Saw Nam Suk, 36 yrs., jobeless, life.

B. Group (77 people):
Jong Dong Kyon, 37 yrs. Chonnam Univ., death.
Kim Sang Youn, 31 yrs., student, 20 years.
Yang Kang Sup, 26 yrs., student, 10 yrs.
Han Sang Sup,
Lee Sung Ryung
Song Son Tae
Lee Jong Jo
Min Suk Whan
Pak Jin
An Kil Jong
Lee Yon
Pak Yong Song
Kwon Hyang Kyon
Kim Yong Hweu
No Jun Hyeon
Cha Sang Sup

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Youn Mok Kyeon
Jong Young Wha
Chon Yong Jin
Jon Young Ho
Kim Un Ki, 33 yrs., Chosun Uni.. 12 years
Yang Hee Sung, 22 yrs., college student, 12 yrs.
You Jae Do
Im Wang Taek
Kim In Man
Lee Kyeong
Lee Woo Jong
Pak Sang Bok
Song Chang Shik
Han Kuk Jae
Yang Won Shik
Kim Dae Hong
Kwak Jae Ku
Pak Chol
Koo Kyo Song
Ahn Choi
Kyeong Jae yong (Myeong)
Kim Sang Ok
Pak Sang Kyu
Choi Mun
Whang In Kap, Hankook Theological Seminary
Han Bong Chol
Lee Nam Kyeun
Jong Ik Sop, Chonnam Univ. professor
Lee Sang Shik
Lee Kwang Woo
Lee Pang Ki
Kim Tae Jin
Youn Yong Kuk
Youn Kwang Jang
Kim Young Keun
Pak Dong Man
Kim Byeong Hak
Pak Kyeong Won
Jong Jae Keun, Chosun University Professor
Choi Dong Youn, student
Youn Jae Yong, student
Kim Wan Soo
Na Myeong Kwan
Shin Eun Soo
Youn Eun Hoo, laborer
Kim Byeong Shik
Kim Chang Kil
Kim Won Kap
Kim Sang Jip
Kim Jong Kon
Lee Nam Bom
Kim Kum Su

Youn Kil Suk
Jo Jae Man
Jo Tae Song
You Ik Keun
Kun Jang Woo, 35 yrs, army re-servist
You So Yong
Jon Chun Shim, 32 yrs, jobless
Cha Yong Sook, 23.

C Group (58 people):
Lee Kwan Baek, 32, student
Lee Moo Hon, 23, jobless
Chan Ki Won, 29, driver
Jang Song Yon, 20, tradesman
Im Sung Chol, 25 yrs., driver.
Youn Suk Roo, 19, death
Lee Jae Ho, 33, 15 yrs.
Lee Jae Chun, re-servist
Yang Ki Nam, 19, shutter maker
Im Song Baek, 16.
Koo Song Hee, 16, shoe maker
Oh Jong Ho, 33
Pak Sung Il, 20
Pak Myeong Kuk
Kim Sam Kyu, 17
Pak Yong Soo, 18
Ahn Song Ok, 17
Kim Doo Jin, 19, jobless
Jong Kwang Ho, 20, laborer
Yom Dong Wook, 23
Lee Song Joo, 18
Kim Kong Hew, 17, laborer
Nam Sung Woo, 19, shutter maker
To Jung Shik, 23
Nam Yong Kwan, 18, farmer
Pak Heung Shik, 21, jobless
Kim Kee Kwang, 18, student
Pak Ahn Shik, 19, jobless
Kim Lee Soo, 20.
Na Il Sun, 18, furniture maker
Kim Tae Chan, 18
Kim Hang Nam, 16, laborer
Kim Jae Kyu, 15, high school student
Im [illegible] Young Sup, 19
Jang Sung Hee, 19, shoe maker
Kim Jong Bae, 25, student, death
Haw [illegible] Kyu Jong, 23, student, life
Chong Sang Young, 30, student, life
Young Kang Ok, 28, student, 10 yrs.
Kim Yong Chol, 32, company employee, 10 yrs.

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Lee Yang Hyeon, 30, jobless
Jong Hae Jik, 29, primary school teacher, 10 yrs.
Kim Wha Song, 21
Pak Nam Son, 26, driver, death
Kim Joon Bong, 21
Pak Chol, 18
Kim Dong Whan, 23, printer
Yang Sung Hee, 20, student
In Byeong Shik, 19
Lee Chung Yong, 20, jobless
Chm Tae Ju, 23, student
Kee Song Kong, 24, farmer
Kim Dok Ho, 26
Lee Song Dae, 18
Pak Yong Soon, 21, student
Lee Kyeong Hee, 20, jobless
Wee Song Nam, 26, student
Jo Jong Kee, 24.

D. Group (13 people):
Hong Nam Soon, 65 yrs., lawyer, life sentence
Kim Song Ryong, 46, Catholic Priest, 15 yrs.
Kyeong No Keun, 47, professor, 10 yrs.
Song Kee Sook, 45, professor
Lee Kee Hong, 46, lawyer
Jo Chol Hyeon, 42, Catholic priest
Oh Byeong Mun, 51, professor
Jo I Ra, 68, President of YWCA Kwangju
Jang Doo Sok, 40, Catholic Farmers Association
Wee In Baek, 31, driver
Lee Ae Shin, 57, YWCA Board of Trustees
Lee Yong Saeng, 65, Director YWCA
Jo Bong Whan, 62, Farmer

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Testimony of

J. Bryan Hehir

for the

United States Catholic Conference

before the

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

of the

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

on

U.S. POLICY IN KOREA:
SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

September 8, 1980

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This testimony, submitted on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC) is based upon the relationship we have had with the Catholic church in Korea. The relationship is predicated, in part, on the substantial impact which U.S. policy has on events in Korea as these affect human dignity, human rights, democratic freedoms and the problem of security. These questions, political in content, are also moral issues precisely because they touch the dignity of the human person and the way in which society is structured. Hence, they engage the church's social ministry of justice and peace in Korea, and because of U.S. involvement with Korea, they are of concern to the church in this country. We are very appreciative, therefore, for the opportunity to submit testimony to this subcommittee which has such a direct and powerful role in shaping U.S. policy toward Korea.

The testimony is based on the continuing analysis we make of U.S.-Korean relations, but more specifically it is the result of a joint USCC-National Council of Churches (NCC) visit to the church in Korea which Ms. Peggy Billings (NCC) and I just made in mid-August. The purpose of this testimony is to draw upon information gained in that visit and to place it in a broader policy perspective. The essential policy question, in our view, is the relationship of human rights and security in Korea; in the context of this question the testimony will also comment on the Kim Dae Jung trial.

I. Human Rights and Security

Human rights were a persistent problem for U.S. policy in Korea

throughout the regime of President Park. The assassination of Park and the steps taken immediately after it raised hopes that the era of dictatorial rule was over and the first steps toward the restoration of democracy could begin. These hopes were jolted by the coup on December 12, 1979, and they were demolished in the restoration of martial law throughout the country in May 1980.

Korea today is on the way back to the atmosphere of the Park era with a vengeance. Indeed most of those we consulted during our visit (Koreans and foreigners) expect the regime of Chon Doo Hwan to be more repressive and more systematically dictatorial than the Park regime. The actions of the government and the atmosphere created by them provide evidence that some of the worst fears of these observers are being realized.

The possibility of truly free and representative elections is a very distant hope. The press is a controlled instrument of propaganda for the government. Our visit coincided with the opening of the trial of Kim Dae Jung and his codefendants as well as with the resignation of President Choi Kyu Ha. The press coverage was designed both to destroy Kim Dae Jung as a public figure and to pave the way for Chon Doo Hwan's take over of the reins of power in Korea. The political opposition has been effectively decimated. The "purification program", an aggressive government campaign against corruption and inefficiency is undoubtedly appreciated as a needed reform by many Koreans. At the same time it is also being used to intimidate labor leaders or others in the work force who could pose any organized resistance to the government. The combination of a controlled press, the lack of political opposition

and the universities being reopened under tight government supervision all produce a situation where freedom of speech is impossible.

This series of actions by the government has created an atmosphere of fear and suspicion which pervades Korean society. For some years now one of the church leaders we visited, Cardinal Kim, the Archbishop of Seoul, has said that this is the fundamental consequence of dictatorial rule: a society in which fear is so pervasive that trust among the population is eroded. People fear the government, its agency the Korean CIA, which seems to be everywhere present, and then they come to fear and distrust each other. This of course is the familiar dynamic of Communist societies, which is precisely what makes the atmosphere so devastating in a society defined by its opposition to and difference from a Communist society.

This attack on human rights and democratic freedoms by the government is justified principally by an appeal to "security". As used by the Korean government, security means military security, i.e., protection of the South from attack or subversion by the North. Now it is clear that people of almost all political persuasion in the South agree that military security is necessary. This was manifest at the time of the announcement of the U.S. troop withdrawal. Those in Korea who were vigorously opposed to the Park regime on human rights grounds and who wanted increased pressure on Park did not want the troops withdrawn.

The debate in Korea is not whether security is necessary; it is whether military security is sufficient. Cardinal Kim has stated forcefully what others believe firmly: the government's

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narrow definition of security (as military) is eroding the real security of the nation.

By failing to develop a concept of security which includes the protection of human rights and the promotion of democratic freedom as essential to security, the government is endangering the future of the country. This is because it creates a kind of opposition among key sectors of the populace which threatens the cohesion of the society. The Cardinal has said often that the present policy destroys the people's will to resist outside forces.

Of particular concern to this testimony is the fact that U.S. policy in its present form reenforces this narrow view of security rather than providing an alternative vision. The Carter policy has proven to be severely disappointing to the Koreans we saw. At the outset of this Administration there was a conscious balance struck between human rights and security considerations in Korea. This was a welcome change from the Kissingerian style of ignoring human rights problems whenever the security question came into play. The Carter policy, therefore, aroused the hopes of the Korean people.

Critics of the Carter policy, here and there, often found the tactics unsatisfactory - the penchant for private diplomatic pressure rather than any public gesture indicating U.S. attempts to intensify the human rights issue in Korea. At times though even public moves were made, the clearest being the significant omission of Korea from Vice President Mondale's first foreign trip in 1977.

Today the debate about the Administration's policy is not

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about tactics but about substance. The tension of the early years between human rights and security has been lost. Perhaps the cause of the shift is increased superpower tension; perhaps it is short-term election year tactics. Whatever the cause, the result is that U.S. policy, implicitly and explicitly, reenforces the direction of Chon Doo Hwan: security equals military security and human rights along with democratic institutions are dispensable items at this time.

No clearer example can be found of the Administration's acquiesence to this line of thinking than its handling of Gen. Wickham's statement of support for Chon Doo Hwan just before our trip to Korea. The statement was taken in Korea as an expression of U.S. policy. At the U.S. embassy I was assured that a spokesman had negated it. In Korea people seemed neither to have heard nor believed the spokesman. The problem was that the Wickham case can be compared to the Singlaub case. The strong feeling was that if General Wickham was sent back, as he now has been, this would illustrate the logic of U.S. policy far more clearly than any statement.

In a sense the present direction of U.S. policy can be grasped by comparing two different issues: the Kim Dae Jung case and the Wickham statement. After modest beginnings, the Administration publicly and privately has intensified its intervention in the case of Kim Dae Jung. Hardly anyone doubts that the U.S. is actively pressing the Korean regime to guarantee that Kim will not be executed. While U.S. efforts to pressure for an "open trial" have hardly been

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successful, the attention given to Kim Dae Jung's fate is appreciated and regarded as very necessary given the regime's desire to rid the country of Kim's witness.

While we concentrate on this case, however, the appearance and the reality seems to be that the main lines of Chon Doo Hwan's policy go uncontested. The Wickham statement has made us prisoners of the policy even though we still contest cases. In this situation our human rights concerns are reduced to specific instances while we fail to deal with the framework which produces the cases.

When pressed on this distinction the Administration usually pleads lack of leverage. The declining amounts of U.S. economic aid are cited as proof of decreasing influence. There is a further concern not to be interventionary which I grant is a healthy concern in principle for U.S. policy. The problem in the Korea case is that pleading nonintervention as a reason for inaction on human rights conveys the idea that the U.S. is an outside observer to the Korean scene. The presence of 37,000 troops, armed with nuclear weapons, and the history of the last 25 years makes the U.S. an actor on the scene: the question is how we use our presence. The plea of lack of leverage rings hollow with Koreans who have lived so close to U.S. presence for so long.

The result of the present policy is a perceptible, indeed palpable, increase of anti-American feeling in Korea. Even a brief visit brings home the fact. It was described for us by church officials, by the families of those on trial and by individuals (Koreans and foreigners) whom we met during our visit. The quality

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of this feeling is different than the kind of anti-American attitude one finds in other nations. For the Koreans it seems to be a case of disappointed expectations, a sense of being let down by American policy on precisely those grounds (human rights and democracy) which they understood to be the distinctive quality of our country. It translates into a sense that we are uninterested in standing abroad for what we treasure at home. One leading church figure summarized it as: you have defended your capitalism abroad but not your democracy?

II. The Trial of Kim Dae Jung

Our visit to Korea coincided by design with the trial of Kim Dae Jung. The USCC and the NCC had supported the idea of an observer from the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) at the Kim trial. When the government turned ICJ down, it became even more necessary, we believed, to have someone present from the U.S. churches when the trial began. We were, of course, not at the trial.

The trial is described as "open" by the Korean government. The claim should be challenged, indeed it should be denied. Nothing we found in the circumstances surrounding the trial gives the adjective open any credibility. Our delegation met with some of the families of the defendants in the trial. As they said in a statement published at the outset of the trial they were totally unsatisfied with the pre-trial preparations. They had tried to hire defense lawyers and found that some had been intimidated while others simply would not take the case. Just days before the trial lawyers suddenly appeared as defense counsel whom they did not know, and

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under the circumstances, could hardly trust.

Admission to the courtroom was by ticket. The press was limited to two foreign correspondents allowed in on a rotating basis along with some members of the Korean press. The foreign reporters prepared a pool story which was censored by the government before it could be used. Five diplomatic observers were allowed into the courtroom.

On the whole the impression one takes away is not only that the trial is not open but the verdict concerning Kim Dae Jung is all but assured. The government controlled press is certainly setting the stage for a guilty verdict. My view is the conviction is assured and that only the sentence is open for negotiation. The U.S. efforts to prevent execution should be maintained and intensified. There is good cause to be concerned.

III. The Kwangju Incident

The other major theme of our visit was the Kwangju incident, the way in which the Korean government suppressed the student-led demonstration in Kwangju during the last two weeks of May. Many descriptions of the event have been published. It is not my purpose to review the details again. I did visit Kwangju and talked with Archbishop Youn and his associates. Three points are worth stressing in this testimony. First, the Archbishop is convinced that the government troops provoked violence from the people. Second, as yet no satisfactory investigation of the incident has taken place; the Archbishop suggested to the government that an international body be invited in to make a report. Third,

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Kwangju has left a population filled with resentment at their own government.

Our visit covered other themes such as the government's handling of the Kwangju incident and the continuing role of the churches in human rights questions. Rather than detail those issues here I conclude with a special plea to this subcommittee to intensify and expand its range of activities regarding U.S.-Korea relations. It is a crucial time and there is a great danger that the pressure of election year politics will override the necessary business of carefully shaping a complex policy. A return to the earlier Administration policy of balancing security concerns with an equally strong policy dimension of human rights is what is needed. I urge the subcommittee to do all it can to assist this change in policy.

# # # #

NSC 3326 NO. 0025

North American Coalition for Human Rights in KOREA / UPDATE

No. 4 October, 1980

Kim Dae-jung Sentenced to Death

The Economist, Sept. 20, 1980: "Mr. Kim Dae-jung was sentenced to death in South Korea on Wednesday for doing what Mr. Ronald Reagan is doing in the United States: challenging the incumbent for the presidency. He is no guiltier of plotting a rebellion that the Republican candidate is. And he is no more a communist than President Carter is."

Newsweek, Sept. 22, 1980: "The evidence was flimsy, but it didn't matter: Kim's real crime is being the most popular opposition leader when President Chun Doo-hwan is trying to tighten his grip."

Kim Dae-jung, South Korea's most prominent democratic leader, was sentenced to death on Sept. 17 in a military court, and 23 other democratic leaders were sentenced to from two to 20 years. Immediately, many countries made strong statements of protest and dismay, as did many U.S. members of Congress and others.

In contrast, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie said only "We will have no additional comment on the matter at this time," while anonymous State Department sources tried to dampen critical responses to the sentencing by hinting — without any basis — that presidential clemency was probable for Kim Dae-jung.

Several days later State Department officials turned down a request from members of Congress that sales of an additional $88 million in military spare parts to South Korea be postponed since it would be "the wrong message at the wrong time."

Kim Dae-jung's Life. According to knowledgable sources, there are still no assurances that Kim Dae-jung will not be executed, and there are ominous signs that President Chun plans to proceed, Ali Bhutto-style. Because there has been little firm pressure from the U.S., the Chun government has gained the upper hand and is using

Kim Dae-jung in June, 1975, under house arrest

Kim's life to gain concessions from the U.S. in the form of full economic and political support and the throttling of U.S.-based criticism of the Chun regime. The State Department is now pressuring Congress not to take any actions showing displeasure toward the South Korean government.

Ironically, as the Washington Post noted, Kim Dae-jung is accused of "precisely the same offense — bringing down the government by violence — that his accusers demonstrably committed." (See chronology of Chun's rise to power on p. 5.)

"Serious Irregularities" in the Trial. In the trial, the prosecution had no witnesses and depended on "confessions" extracted from Kim

110 Maryland Avenue NE, Washington DC 20002 • 202-546-4304
475 Riverside Drive Room 1538 New York NY 10027 • 212-678-6260

Stephen K. Gleysteen Jr., the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, being greeted by President Chun Doo Hwan, right, on his inaugural reception yesterday in Seoul. The man at center is unidentified.

and has 25 representatives during [illegible] cal or mental torture which left one defendant with a broken [illegible] another [illegible]

Kim's own lawyers were arrested during the trial and [illegible] for questioning. Amnesty International and [illegible] Jurists representatives were barred from the trial. Although South Korea is [illegible] and foreign [illegible] fully [illegible] they were [illegible] reported in the [illegible]

[illegible] the [illegible] the [illegible] South Korea. It was the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]



Kim Dae Jung at an election rally in 1970.

Andrew Young

South Korea's Martin Luther King

Imagine the horror and turmoil that would have swept the United States after the Birmingham demonstrations of 1963, the U.S. government had tried Martin Luther King Jr. on conspiracy and sentenced him to death.

Kim Dae Jung is South Korea's Martin Luther King Jr. Following the assassination of President Park Chung Hee, Kim and thousands of dissident human rights activists and their many of them educated in the United States began peaceful demonstrations in an effort to achieve a civilian democratic to replace the Park dictatorship. Hundreds were arrested and tried by a military court that had been appointed by the Park regime and remains subject to the military straightjacket. Kim Dae Jung, who was elected to the national assembly in the public-stamp national assembly, has no legitimate role in the people.

Kim Dae Jung has been sentenced to death by hanging. Kim emerged as a central figure in opposition to Park Chung Hee when he became the united candidate of a fragmented opposition party in the presidential election of 1971. In that election, Kim came close to defeating Park in spite of massive government efforts at intimidation and vote buying. Park got 53 percent of the vote; Kim got 45 percent.

Since that election, Kim Dae Jung has been the victim of multiple efforts to silence him. First came a mysterious automobile accident and then a kidnaping from his home in Tokyo. Then imprisonment and house arrest. Finally, in 1976, Kim Dae Jung, because of his role in the region, he joined with former [illegible] and Quaker [illegible] in a [illegible] coalition for the restoration of democracy that united all elements of dissent. This coalition which included representatives of the religious intelligentsia and journalists began to organize communities demanding democracy and respect for human rights.

South Korea is the nation where thousands of American [illegible] died defending freedom between 1950 and 1953. The United States has viewed that country as an integral part of its strategy of containment of communism in the region. But with the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China and the disappearance of the fear of the Soviet hordes, the strategy of containment has given way to increased trade and cooperation with China and a greater role for Japan in the region. The continuing maintenance of the South Korean totalitarian dictatorship on the other hand is paying [illegible] was for Vietnam, Chile and other [illegible] South Korean freedom that appear to be [illegible].

The State Department has issued mild warnings but has resisted [illegible] to the possibility of postponement or withdrawal of economic assistance commitments or U.S. support for World Bank loans.

The government of Gen. Chun Doo Hwan appears to take advantage of U.S. inaction. [illegible] desire to contain moderate opposition, the general views as a threat to be [illegible] were.

In the last March issue a statement of the goals of the coalition for restoration of democracy [illegible] the document is strikingly [illegible] organization of [illegible] people of the area, [illegible] national security, promote development of a free economic system, attainment of social justice, strengthening of peace and good relations with friendly nations such as the U.S. and Japan, and unification with North Korea through peaceful dialogue.

Within moderate democratic leadership, the continuing economic recovery and growth of South Korea are in danger strengthening extreme solutions of revolutionary groups bent on violence or underground guerrilla activity. Needless to say, this would invite the participation and infiltration of the North Koreans.

Strategic security interests and human rights converge in the case of Kim Dae Jung. To avoid further polarizing and traumatizing South Korean society, the military government should drop the false charges against Kim and his co-defendants, release all political prisoners and open a timetable for full and free democratic elections.

U.S. elections will be over in a few weeks and a Congress, still committed to human rights and democracy, will find it difficult to authorize the expenditure of South Korean military arms with American tax dollars.

The execution of former Pakistani President Ali Bhutto was controversially forgiven once the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. But can't expect everyone to forget that Korean dictator earned by no one executes by hanging Kim Dae Jung. Clergymen of conscience and U.S. human rights advocates will keep this issue alive, and a martyr's role Dae Jung will prove to be a far more powerful [illegible] than in death.

Chun's "New Era." Events since Chun [illegible] coup d'etat in May can be compared to those in Chile after Pinochet's coup. Many Koreans describe the situation now as worse than any time during President Park's rule [illegible] political prisoners. Since the coup, tens of thousands of people have been arrested or sent to "re-education" camps, many for participating in demonstrations last spring. Hundreds of others are still missing, their families unsure whether they are among the more than 1,000 killed in the coup, in hiding, or under arrest. Countless others have been interrogated, threatened, and released.

Total press censorship. One observer [illegible] that the press in South Korea is now as controlled as that in the U.S.S.R. Chun has banned 172 publications, including almost all intellectual and economic journals. Newspapers were told that "there are too many different newspapers published," and the government will decide which to close on the basis of their performance in the coming months. All are now [illegible] the government favor, and have instructions [illegible] overseas sections not to include any material critical of the government as well. Several [illegible] journalists have been fired, most for being "pessimistic and unfortunate," i.e., [illegible] to support Chun.

[illegible] Chun has expressed his intent to [illegible] after [illegible] leaves office. [illegible] All [illegible] the [illegible] yesterday at the [illegible] Chun's [illegible] out of [illegible] at least for [illegible] and [illegible] to [illegible] Supreme [illegible]

and almost all parties agree that a threat to [illegible] troops now would be ill-timed or inappropriate. But there are many other ways for the U.S. to express its opinion forcefully.

- Congress noted in passing the FY81 Foreign Assistance Act that any shipments of MAP military equipment to South Korea must be approved by Congress. Since under present circumstances this stipulation cannot be [illegible] Congress could defer the suspension of all [illegible] until [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]

Whose Coup? The U.S. and Chun's Rise to Power

Oct. 26, 1979: Pres. Park is assassinated by Kim Jae-kyu, director of the KCIA, in the midst of growing demonstrations against Park's authoritarian rule. Hopes swell for peaceful change from Park's repressive "Yushin" constitution to a democratic one. Martial law is declared throughout South Korea except for Cheju Island. Prime Minister Choi Kyu-ha becomes figurehead President.

Oct. 30: U.S. Defense Dep't officials recommend that the U.S. rely on the South Korean army to wield political power.

Nov. 1: Over 50 South Korean generals meet to discuss country's political future, decide to scrap Yushin constitution. A minority of about 9 younger "hawkish" generals led by Gen. Chun Doo-hwan, a protege of Park, oppose the change.

Nov. 6: Secretary of State Vance, attending Park's funeral, calls for South Korea to "proceed in an orderly manner along (Yushin) constitutional lines," does not encourage a rapid end to martial law, and does not commit the U.S. openly to support a shift to democratic rule.

Nov. 8: South Korean police arrest 140 leaders of the democratic movement during a meeting at the Seoul YMCA calling for rapid democratization. A number are badly beaten and tortured at the Army Security Command, headed by Gen. Chun Doo-hwan. The U.S. declines to comment.

Dec. 12: Gen. Chun Doo-hwan leads a bloody coup within the military command one day before Pres. Choi is to announce his new Cabinet and amidst rumors of Chun's transfer to a "distant post." The army chief of staff and 16 other generals and their staff are "arrested." Pres. Choi is held under house arrest. Chun illegally moves troops under U.S. command from the DMZ to Seoul. Gen. John Wickham, head of the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces Command, forces Chun but does little else for a crime normally punishable by hanging or discharge.

Dec. 13: Gens. Chun and his followers are in control of the army, forces at least 9 of their choices into key positions in Pres. Choi's new cabinet. Chun appoints his brother-in-law to be martial law commander and begins behind-the-scenes control of government policy.

January: The U.S. "strongly discourages" plans for a counter-coup by moderates against Chun in the Korean military, according to later statements by Gen. Wickham. Meanwhile, Chun forces the retirement or otherwise eliminates some 60 senior Korean generals.

Feb. 6: Gen. Wickham, after deciding that the U.S. "can live with" Chun, testifies in Congress that he has been "assured the military would stay out of politics."

Feb. 13: State Department Director of Korean Affairs Robert Rich states that "we have noted thus far no evidence of the imposition of military views" on the South Korean government.

March 11: Gen. Wickham is quoted in the Asian Wall Street Journal as saying that the South Korean military's proper role includes "being watch-dogs on political activity that could be destabilizing" and in a way making "judgements about the eligibility and reliability of political candidates that may have some adverse influence on stability."

Apr. 14: Gen. Chun becomes acting director of the KCIA, in addition to being head of the Army Security Command, further deepening his involvement in civilian politics. State Department, when questioned, repeats assurances that political development will proceed in Korea.

May 17: With pressures for democracy deepening and the National Assembly expected to meet on May 20 to vote to end martial law, Gen. Chun's forces move to complete their coup d'etat. Nationwide martial law is declared, forbidding all political activity; universities are closed; National Assembly is banned from meeting; criticism of present and past national leaders is forbidden; hundreds of democratic leaders, politicians, students, and others are arrested, including prominent opposition leader Kim Dae-jung.

May 19: Asked about Kim Dae-jung's arrest, a State Department spokesperson says "no comment."

May 19-21: Demonstrations in Kwangju against Chun's coup d'etat and Kim's arrest swell in size in response to brutality used by the army against them, resulting in probably over 1,000 deaths. Military are eventually forced out of the city.

May 20: U.S. Pentagon announces that it has released 4 battalions of Korean troops under its control for use in suppressing the Kwangju demonstrations.

May 21: Hodding Carter, State Department spokesperson, announces to reporters that the Carter administration "has decided to support the

restoration of security and order in South Korea while deferring pressure for political liberalization." Kwangju is orderly and quiet, but encircled by 10,000 troops.

May 26: Citizens in Kwangju appeal to the U.S. government to help negotiate a truce. 10:00 pm Korea time: AFKN (U.S. armed forces radio) broadcasts news of the appeal as its top story. The U.S. Embassy tells an American caller that they know of no such appeal, whereupon the American tells them of the AFKN report. 11:00 pm: AFKN does not carry the story. The American calls to ask why, and is told that Gen. Doleman called and told them to kill the story. 1:00 am: The State Department declines to mediate, saying "We recognize that a situation of total disorder and disruption in a major city cannot be allowed to go on indefinitely." 3:30 am: Order in Kwangju, maintained by a citizens' committee, is destroyed by martial law troops who invade the city, killing many more people. Military establishes control.

June 5: Despite further moves by the military to strengthen its political power and prohibit dissent, Ex-Im Bank President John Moore promises in Seoul that the bank will continue to give economic support and finalizes new loans. Uproar which follows forces State Department to announce a "complete re-evaluation of all aspects of our relations with Korea except our security commitment," but the only visible results are an abstention on an Asian Development Bank loan and postponement of some trips and meetings.

July: Spence Richardson, First Secretary of the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, says in regard to U.S. options for pressuring South Korea: "Yes, we have a lot of things we could do. We have a lot of power here. The question is, do we want to use it. The answer is no."

Aug. 8: Gen. Wickham states in a newspaper interview that the U.S. would be willing to support Gen. Chun if he became president and could maintain stability. The interview is highly publicized in South Korean newspapers, all military-censored, and Gen. Chun begins to openly "campaign" for the presidency. Wickham, who probably accurately reflected U.S. policy but spoke out of place, returned to the U.S. for Defense Dep't meetings soon after the interview, but was allowed to return to Korea, a signal to the South Korean government.

Aug. 16: U.S. decides not to protest Chun's probable ascension to the presidency.

Aug. 27: Gen. Chun is selected president by a rubber-stamp electoral college with no opposition. Since May 17 he has arrested and otherwise eliminated all possible political opponents, dismissed about 9,000 government officials, arrested nearly 60,000 "hooligans," closed 172 publications, and forced the firing of about 230 journalists.

Sept. 8: State Department notifies Congress of its intent to sell an additional $88 million in military spare parts to South Korea.

Sept. 10: Prosecutor in trial of Kim Dae-jung and 23 other democratic leaders demands a death sentence for Kim. State Department says it "couldn't comment on the trial, which is still underway."

Sept. 17: Kim is sentenced to death after a trial characterized by Amnesty International as "falling far short of international legal standards." Secretary of State Muskie says, "Since the case is subject to judicial review we will have no additional comment on the matter at this time."

September: State Department pressures members of Congress not to take strong actions toward Korea, and hints to journalists that a commutation of Kim's sentence by Pres. Chun is likely while in actuality there is no such agreement or understanding. Congress members ask State Department to withdraw the proposed sale of an additional $88 million in military spare parts to Seoul, but the State Department declines.

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